

Wáng Ching-wei's Memorandum

to the Japanese Government, 1942

Han-sheng Lin

Wang Ching-wei's Memorandum to the Japanese Government, 1942

The period of China's modern transformation is one of the most exciting in history, and the men who made it possible are fascinating figures. Among them none is more colorful than Wang Ching-wei. Since the turn of the century, Wang had played a major role in the Chinese revolution. Subsequently he was an architect of the Republic, the first chairman of the Nationalist government, and premier in the critical years 1932-1935. Even after he was wounded by a would-be assassin in November 1935, he returned to be Chairman of the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang, the highest decision-making body of the Nanking government. The importance of Wang derives not only from his official titles but also from his involvement in most of the major events in modern Chinese history. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, Wang was the center of inspiration of those who opposed imperialism and warlordism. He drafted the famous "Manifesto of the Kuomintang" and the "Will of Sun Yat-sen," and he set down the guidelines for China's foreign policy in his celebrated book China and the Nations.¹ In Wuhan, he was in charge of the purge of the Communists, and in the Great Battle of the Northern Plain, he was the civilian leader opposing Chiang Kai-shek's effort to establish military control. In the early 1930's he was largely responsible for the relatively progressive era of the Nationalists.² However, his most important and controversial role was as advocate of peace with Japan before and after the Lu-kuo-ch'iao Incident in July 1937; indeed it was his "infamous" collaboration with the Japanese during the Pacific War which made him known in the West.³

Most publications during wartime were hostile to Wang, except a secret report compiled by the U.S. War Department.⁴ After the war, the value of Wang's peace efforts and his eventual collaboration with the Japanese has been gradually reviewed. Many scholars were disappointed at his capitulation to the

Japanese after his failure in his peace efforts, but few were hostile to him.⁵

Professor John K. Fairbank has suggested a theory of dyarchy or Chinese cooperation with alien dynastic rule for the benefit of the Chinese which may be applied to Wang's case.⁶ Professor Hilary Conroy pioneered the study of Wang from Japanese sources in terms of the failure of Japanese "crusaders" to change the ideology of the Kuomintang. Professor Conroy says:

Nevertheless, the new Wang Ching-wei nationalist government came step by step into existence, and the Japanese crusaders, who had so relentlessly castigated the Kuomintang, had a great deal of their own ideology to swallow back. Wang let there be no mistake about it. His was the nationalist government; his party was the Kuomintang; the principles of his government were the San Min Chu I, the three Peoples' principles of Sun Yat-sen; the flag was the Kuomintang flag, with characters for "peace, anti-Communist and national reconstruction" added. Nanking was again the capital of China.⁷

Later, Professor Kimitada Miwa utilizing recent publications of memoirs by Japanese participants in Wang's peace efforts and his government concluded:

The degree of autonomy and independence on which Wang had insisted proved a considerable handicap to the Japanese military especially when, from 1942 onwards, their chances of victory in the Pacific War began to wane.

To relieve the harsh fate of the oppressed people in occupied China became more and more the one positive aim of the Wang Government. History may judge in the end that Wang began to negotiate with the enemy from the sincere motive of bringing about peace in a situation where further resistance seemed useless, but that what in the end he only accomplished was a measure of relief for the cruelly oppressed people of occupied China.⁸

Perhaps it is time to evaluate Wang's own writings in order to understand how he operated under enemy bayonets. In addition to Wang's own speeches and essays, the writing of his intimate followers, such as Chou Fo-hai,

Ch'en Kung-po, and Chin Hsiung-pai deserves special attention. However, a memorandum by Wang addressed to the Japanese government in 1942 which has been uncovered in Japanese archives provides a clear picture of the technique Wang employed to protect the people of occupied China.⁹ Also contained therein are indications that he turned the issue of participating in the Pacific War away from the Japanese, avoided sending a single soldier to fight against the Allies, prevented the Japanese military from extracting Chinese manpower and resources for the Pacific War, and sought to preserve the vitality of China. His personal appeal to the highest Japanese authorities, sometimes with emotion and sometimes with reason and common sense, is most impressive. No wonder, after the end of the war while Wang's followers were cheered and sympathized by many people, the Chungking government which had won the war was generally held in contempt.¹⁰

Because of the importance of the document and the controversial nature of the subject, the whole text is translated and annotated.

Translation of Chairman Wang Ching-wei's Memorandum*

Mr. Special Envoy under the order of His Majesty came from afar to return our visit from whom we have learned the good health of His Majesty with utmost consolation and pleasure.¹¹ We are also grateful to the gracious purpose of His Majesty pertaining to the co-prosperity of East Asia and friendly relations of China and Japan in his Imperial letter. As recalled, last June when I visited Tokyo His Majesty entertained me with the most impressive ceremony and exceptional kindness, which I could hardly forget.¹² The great expectations and preferential treatment of the governmental officers and people made me appreciative and fearful,

Sept. 22-27, 1942

and I do not know how to return their gratitude.

Since the Pacific War, the prestige of your country is becoming widespread, and the bases of evil influence of Britain and the United States in the Pacific, the South Ocean and other islands in the past hundred years, have been completely wiped out.¹³ Once the danger of aggression is eliminated, the foundation of reconstruction of the New Order in East Asia shall be established. As a result of the bravery of the armed forces of the army and navy of your country and the unanimous support of your people the achievements are admirable. The assistance rendered to my country has not been forgotten because of the progress of the Great East Asian War, and the big loan for reconstruction signed last June has not been interrupted regardless of the urgency of the War.¹⁴ This loan enables the [Reformed] Nationalist government to proceed with its military and economic construction according to its plan. Also, at the time of enormous sacrifice of your armed forces in the Great East Asian War, you have still divided the remaining force to assist us for the task of pacification of villages. Consequently, Kiangsu province was able to complete this according to the first, second and third period successively. Further, the area has been enlarged to include the southern area of the Great Lake and Shanghai, which makes the prosperous area of the lower Yangtze River secure.¹⁵ The [Reformed] Nationalist government cannot help but exert its power and energy to materialize the mission of peace, anti-Communism and reconstruction of the country in order to share the work.

Three years ago, I met Mr. Hiranuma when he was Premier. At that time he said: "As a result of the European War, the League of Nations was created, but the thinking of utilitarianism was so widespread that the direction of the League was wrong. Consequently, many disputes arose, which produced today's chaotic situation. China and Japan should be based on the moral spirit of the

P. 5 missing. See original.

(Concerning the opinion participating the war)

and it is not the appropriate time for us to devote our forces to participate in the War. This is not enough to arouse the morality of the soldiers and to consolidate the minds of the people. Presently, even though our armed forces are not sufficient [to declare war], it would have enormous impact [on the populace] merely to indicate our standpoint.²⁰ As for financial resources, in order to disturb the minds of the people, the Chungking authorities have constantly propagandized that in the peace area the material resources are flowing out and are to dry up very soon. If we could overtly and with dignity supply materials to cooperate with Japan for the Great East Asian War, not only could the Chungking authorities not extend this plausible delusion, but also the peace area could feel the importance of their responsibilities and the sacredness of their mission to make further efforts to increase production. Therefore, the participation of the War by our country is a natural sequence of justice and the common aspirations in the minds of the people. It is not to use the name of the participation in the War in order to take over the rights of Britain and the United States that were left behind in China.²¹ Further, it is also not to achieve a position in the coming peace conference of the world.

Concerning the opinion promoting a general peace

Since our leaving Chungking, our greatest aim has been to search for ways to achieve peace between China and Japan, and to make old compatriots change their minds so as to cooperate in reconstructing the ruined and in rebuilding of a new foundation [for the country.] In my mind it is extremely regrettable and I am uneasy for being unable to achieve it with our uninterrupted efforts in the past few years. After the beginning of the Great East Asian War, all the news which we have obtained in this regard is very pessimistic. I wish to analyse this as follows:

(1) Chiang Kai-shek and his personal clique, who erroneously believe in the invulnerability of Britain and the United States, are getting in deeper and becoming more foolish than ever before. Since the beginning of the Great East Asian War, they have stood side by side with Britain and the United States in the battlefront, which has indeed been their desire over the past many years. Even though Britain and the United States have been repeatedly defeated, they are still erroneously convinced that final victory will belong to Britain and the United States. Their daily arguments are that China's sufferings would be at last relieved as a result of the Anglo-American victory because [China has fought] a bitter war [on their side] for several years,²² and that even if Britain and the United States were defeated, China would have the same position as Britain and the United States in a future peace conference. At that time, Britain might not be completely destroyed and the United States could still maintain herself unmolested; China as a result might suffer, but it is much better than negotiating peace with Japan now unilaterally. This opinion is unbreakable [among the Chungking authorities]. Thus, the argument for a general peace is impossible. Further, Chiang's personal clique such as Kung Hsiang-hsi and Sung Tse-wen (T.V. Soong) have deposited their private properties in the United States and taken their families there. They are combined with the United States in an inseparable relationship; therefore, whenever they hear of any peace movement they made every effort to obstruct it. The recent construction of the northwestern highway is not to rely on the Soviet Union, but is to use the Soviet Union to make contacts with the United States, which is much more convenient than the crossing of India and Tibet. Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists are subversive and jealous of each other, and at one time they might have split but for the mediation of Britain and the United States. The latter make use of the United

Front of Chiang and the Communists to resist Japan and would not like to see Chiang and the Communists separate. Chiang does not want to lose the friendship of Britain and the United States, and consequently, he unites with the Communists merely in body and not in spirit.²³ As a result, before the downfall of Britain and the United States, a general peace is hopeless.

(2) The armies and people other than Chiang's personal clique have been changing sides day and night in the civil war era, but they at present are guided by the thinking of nationalism. Though they at heart desire a general peace, they realize that if they come back separately the Japanese would not pay much attention to them; therefore, each commander has the same psychology related to the issue: they could get much better peace terms if they could come back together [as a group.] However, the political and economic situation in the peace area is not as good as expected. Though Japan has made a declaration on strengthening the [Reformed] Nationalist government and on various kinds of assistance to it, the political authorities in the peace area are not free, and the general regulation of material in the peace area has injured the people greatly. Further, the program of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation has not yet concretely materialized. These are undeniable facts. Thus, people feel that a War of Resistance is hopeless, but it is equally hopeless for peace.²⁴ They are irresolute and circumspect. On the one hand they are heartbroken and tired of the War, but on the other hand they can not make up their minds for peace. This is the common psychology of the armies and people.

As mentioned-above, I, Chao-ming, (Wang Ching-wei), and others, have not diminished our determination to promote a general peace because of these endless obstacles, but I hope that the people of our friendly country [Japan] will understand how difficult it is to obtain it.

Concerning the strengthening of the [Reformed] Nationalist government

The greatest responsibility of the [Reformed] Nationalist government is to promote a general peace on the one hand and to cooperate [with Japan] to accomplish the Great East Asian War on the other. For the purpose of letting the [Reformed] Nationalist government bear two great responsibilities, it is necessary to strengthen the [Reformed] Nationalist government. If it is not strengthened, it will be impossible to set up a model for peace in the peace area for the people to consolidate their trust, and for the people outside of it to build up their confidence in [the government] and to come back gradually. If so, how can we achieve a general peace? Also, if the [Reformed] Nationalist government is not strengthened, its spiritual and physical forces will daily decline, and how then can it have the strength to make contributions to the Great East Asian War. The most important way to strengthen the [Reformed] Nationalist government is twofold. First, pertaining to politics, the [Reformed] Nationalist government and all other provincial, municipal, and district governments under [its jurisdiction] should discuss those matters with the Japanese Embassy and the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and other existing local authorities if they are related to Japan and security matters, and after frank consultations, the Japanese authorities should render them every cooperation and assistance and not obstruct [their execution]. This will make the [Reformed] Nationalist government obtain prestige and trust from its people. The [Reformed] Nationalist government should have the liberty to promote or to discharge its official personnel according to merit. If the government has no power and trust, it is a government in name only, not in substance. It has no value for existence at all. Second, pertaining to economics, the Chinese people at present urgently need to increase production. This is the basis not only for the revival of China

but also for cooperation in the Great East Asian War. In order to increase production, we must let the peasants, workers and merchants grow, and consequently all unnecessary regulations and restrictions of the present time must be liberalized by the Japanese authorities, because these are equivalent to the restrictions and regulations of the Chinese people.²⁵ The Japanese authorities would not benefit from them, but the Chinese authorities are facing a dead end, and the peasants, workers and merchants can never hope to recover. This is a unanimous appeal of the Chinese people. If you would listen to these outlines, a detailed separate proposal will be made.²⁶

The above description contains my heartfelt words. For the sake of the situation of East Asia and the future of our two countries, I could not but tell you frankly. If these [proposals] were accepted by you it would be most fortunate.

It is clear that Wang was trying to make use of the issues of the Pacific War and the promotion of a general peace to strengthen his government and benefit the Chinese people living in Japanese occupied areas. It was a typical maneuver of Wang and his followers.²⁷ As Chou Fo-hai proudly testified in his trial in 1946 that:

In the first half of the period when I participated in the Nanking government, I attempted, by keeping in touch with the enemy, to turn things to the advantage of my country; in the latter half, I tried to turn them against the enemy by maintaining contact with my country, [the Chungking government]²⁸

It is ironic indeed that most of Wang's followers were to be condemned as "traitors," and put to death or imprisoned.²⁹

1. Ch'en Jerome, "The Left Wing Kuomintang--A Definition," Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, (Oct. 1962), pp. 561-562.
2. Boorman, Howard L., "Wang Ching-wei: China's Romantic Radical," Political Science Quarterly, vol. LXXIX no. 4, (Dec. 1964), 514-515. See also my dissertation for a detailed argument of Wang's position in the Nanking government. Lin, Han-sheng, Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese Peace Efforts (University of Pennsylvania, 1967 unpublished), University Microfilms 67-12,773. pp. 97-106.
3. A typical report of Wang in the wartime is presented in Lawrence K. Rossinger's China's Wartime Politics 1937-1944, (Princeton, 1944), pp. 33-34. Rossinger said: "The characteristic elements entering into Wang's actions were his inordinate ambition, and his lack of any means of satisfying this lust for power." This description was exactly as the Chinese propagandists accused Wang and his conducts. See: Wu Chih-hui, Wu Ching-heng hsuan-chi, cheng-lun (Selected Works of Wu Chih-hui, Political Essays), vol. 2, (Taipei, 1967), pp. 213-229 & 234-239. Fu Ssu-nien, Fu Ssu-nien hsuan-chi, (Selected Works of Fu Ssu-nien), vol. 7, (Taipei, 1967), pp. 1217-1224. However, an American reporter, Don Bate, based on his personal interview with Wang and observation in occupied China, wrote a most favorable book of Wang and his works. Don Bate, Wang Ching-wei: Puppet or Patriot? (Chicago, 1941). The attitude of the United States government was well expressed by Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. He says: "The Axis powers found no difficulty in recognizing Wang Ching-wei but the puppet regime was still an effigy of straw and Japanese bayonets." The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, I. (New York, 1948), 725.
4. As the Department of War noted: "In this connection it is of significance that it is not those reactionary leaders of the Kuomintang, who are most strongly opposed to the Communists and who have been most commonly referred to as 'appeasers,' that have joined the Japanese to serve under them as puppets. On the contrary, it is so-called leftist leaders like Wang Ching-wei, and ex-Communists like Ch'en Kung-po and Chou Fu-hai, who have become the outstanding puppets. The Kuomintang officials who joined Wang Ching-wei in Nanking were for the most part his personal followers. Aside from them the majority of the puppet officials came from non-Kuomintang parties and groups." Lyman Van Slyke, ed., The Chinese Communist Movement, (Stanford, 1968), p. 100f.
5. John Leighton Stuart, once U.S. Ambassador to China and a close friend of Chiang Kai-shek writes in 1954 that "He (Wang Ching-wei) seemed to be motivated too by three other reasons: an honest difference of opinion with the national leaders over various matters; deep jealousy of Chiang Kai-shek and a psychopathic fear of war." Fifty Years in China, (New York, 1954), p. 38. Professor David Lu gives a detailed description of the Wang government without any serious accusations against Wang, but he concludes that the signing of the basic treaty made Wang's "capitulation complete." From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, (Washington, 1963), p. 128. James Shirley, an admirer of Wang, writes in his dissertation that Wang had become a "full-fledged traitor," due to "frustrations." Political Conflict in the Kuomintang: The Career of Wang Ching-wei to 1932, (University of California, Berkeley, 1963, unpublished), University Microfilms, 64-9113; p.233.

6. Fairbank, John K., The United States and China, (Cambridge, 1958), p. 72.
7. Conroy, F. Hilary, "Japan's War in China: An Ideological Somersault," Pacific Historical Review, XXI, no. 4, (Nov. 1952), 377.
8. Kimitada Miwa, "The Wang Ching-wei Regime and Japanese Efforts to Terminate the China Conflict," Studies in Japanese Culture, ed. Joseph Roggenborff, (Tokyo, 1963), p. 142.
9. Wang Ching-wei himself was a prolific writer. His essays and speeches during wartime were partly published, and some of them were translated into English by T'ang Liang-li. See: Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng ho-p'ing yün-tung yen-lun chi (Collected Speeches and Essays on the Peace Movement) (Canton, 1939); Wang Chu-hsi fang-jih yen-lun chi (Collected Speeches of Chairman Wang during His Visit to Japan); Wang Chu-hsi ho-p'ing yün-tung chih yen-lun (Speeches and Essays on the Peace Movement by Chairman Wang) (Canton, 1940-1941); Wang Chu-hsi yen-lun chi (Collected Speeches and Essays of Chairman Wang) (n.p. 1943); Wang Chu-hsi yen-lun chi, ti-wu chi (A Collection of Essays and Speeches of Chairman Wang, vol. 5) (Canton, 1943); Wang Hsien-sheng chih chung-yao chien-i (Important Proposals of Wang Ching-wei) (Hong Kong, 1939); Fundamentals of National Salvation: A Symposium by Wang Ching-wei and Others, Edited by T'ang Liang-li (Shanghai, 1942); The Peace Movement in China, A Collection of Documents with a Prefatory Note, (n.p. 1939). Chou Fo-hai, Chou Fo-hai jih-chi (The Diary of Chou Fo-hai) (Hong Kong, n.d.). Ch'en Kung-po, "Pa-nien lai te hui-i," (Reminiscence of the Past Eight Years or Autobiography), which is attached to the fourth volume of Chin Hsiung-pai's Wang Cheng-ch'uan te k'ai-chang yü shou-ch'ang, (The Beginning and End of the Wang Regime), 5 vols, (Hong Kong, 1959-1964).
10. Chou Fo-hai defended himself in his trial on October 21, 1946, and his testimony often was interrupted by applause from the audience. When he said: "The people in this court please be my witness. In terms of price stability and security whether the Nanking government under the 'puppet organization' at that time ruled better or that of today after victory?" the audience replied with hearty applause. Chin, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 121. The same situation applies to Ch'en Kung-po's defense. Ibid., p. 23. Professor Robert H.G. Lee writes a rather favorable review of Chin's volumes, and further confirms the friendly attitude towards the Wang government. He says: "Judging from the reaction of the disillusioned populace of Shanghai and Nanking in the postwar takeover, there seems to have been considerable sympathy for what the Wang regime had been able to do in circumventing the harsh exactions of the Japanese militarists." Wang Cheng-ch'uan ti k'ai-chang yü shou-ch'ang (The Beginning and End of the ~~Drama~~ of the Wang Regime), vols. 1-4, by Chu Tzu-chia (pseudonym), Journal of Asian Studies, XXIII, (1963), 128. Wang Ching-wei in his final political testament indicates that "...there are two possible gains..... for negotiating with the Japanese. First, the Nationalist government (The Nanking government under Wang) at present is representing the people at the occupied area to negotiate with the enemy in this area. If I, Chao-ming (Wang Ching-wei) could obtain anything from the negotiation, it would not be harmful to the Chungking government; if my negotiation failed it would at least stall the attack of the enemy...."

...."I, Chao-ming though with my bare hands, have tried to preserve the vitality of national sovereignty in the sphere of southeast provinces with the utmost perseverance to insist and execute (my proposals) regardless of any obstacle under the pretext that within our domestic jurisdiction the foreigners should not intervene."....Wang Ching-wei, "Tsui-hou te hsin-ch'ing" (The Final Political Testament of Wang Ching-wei), Chin, op. cit., vol. 5, 159-162. Ch'en Kung-po in his "Autobiography" indicates that "In the past five and a half years, the Nanking government could be said there was not a single day without some kind of struggles with the Japanese. Except fighting for peace terms, in politics there were struggles for freedom and unification; in military affairs, there were struggles for independence and for ridding of Japanese bondage; in economics, there were struggles for preserving materials and vitality of the country and the people." Ch'en Kung-po, "Pai-nien-lai te hui-i", Chin, op. cit., vol. 4, p.202.

* This memorandum was given to the Hoover Institute of War, Peace and Revolution at Stanford by the Japanese section of the Department of State. The authenticity of this document can be verified by the facts mentioned in the contents and by Wang's "Final Political Testament" published in Hong Kong twenty years after his death as requested by him. This document indicates very well how the Chinese "collaborators," particularly Wang Ching-wei and his followers, operated for the benefit of the Chinese in the occupied area, and it could lead us to further investigation of the problems of alien rule in Chinese history. It is indeed one of the most important documents uncovered so far relating to the operation of the Wang government.

11. The special envoy apparently is Hiranuma Kiichiro, once prime minister of Japan.
12. In June, 1941, Wang went to Tokyo to negotiate a loan to rehabilitate south-east provinces and to build up an independent force of the Nanking government.
13. The Pacific War started with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in Dec. 1941. The Japanese victories at the initial stage had given hope that the influence of the United States and Great Britain would be eliminated from East Asia. For the past hundred years, China had struggled to get rid of imperialist influence. Wang spoke of them to convince the Japanese of his eagerness to cooperate in the Pacific War in order to get Japan's support for his domestic programs. Wang, "The Final Political Testament," loc. cit., p. 158. Wang states specifically that "In fact the (Nanking) government in the occupied area used (the declaration of War against the Allies) as a means to struggle for sovereignty and to hold onto resources, and (the Nanking government) has never sent a single soldier or shot a single arrow against the United States and Great Britain."
14. In other words, the Japanese government was bound to fulfill its treaty obligation to support the Nanking government financially regardless of its difficulties in the Pacific War. Furthermore, Wang was able to take back foreign concessions including the Japanese concessions and to abolish extra-territoriality, which Wang considers the happiest thing in his political testament. loc. cit., pp. 158-159. Mrs. Ch'en Kung-po also told the author

in our interview that the happiest thing in her husband's political adventure was to recover foreign concessions and rights.

15. Chou Fo-hai proudly pointed out to the court in his trial that the Nanking government was able to return southeastern provinces to the Chungking government intact without losing any ground to the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek in his March 26, 1947 special order to pardon Chou Fo-hai for his treacherous crime indicates that since 1941, Chou had submitted to the Chungking government, that "he was able to preserve order in the Nanking-Shanghai area and to protect people from suffering," and that "he has made not a little contribution to the security of the society." Chin, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 110-111.
16. Peace, anti-Communism and reconstruction were the original slogan for the peace movement and for the establishment of the Nanking government.
17. Wang had repeatedly made use of Hiranuma's conversation with him to emphasize the moral spirit of the East in order to have further concessions from the Japanese, Wang, "The Final Political Testament," loc. cit., pp. 157-160.
18. This statement refers to his first visit to Japan in June 1939.
19. This refers to the Battle of Northern Plain in 1929-1930, in which battle a coalition of the opponents of Chiang Kai-shek was created under the leadership of Wang in order to overthrow Chiang's dictatorship. Shortly after, because of the Manchurian Incident, September 1931, Wang and Chiang made a compromise in the Shanghai and Hangchow conferences to meet the emergent situation of national crisis.
20. Here Wang very skillfully indicated that his commitment was only limited to indicate their standpoint to have its enormous impact on the populace.
21. As mentioned China had recovered her concessions from foreign powers by merely participating in the Pacific War, even though Wang stated here that he did not mean to use this issue to "take over the right of Britain and the United States."
22. The recent debate onto whether or not Chiang Kai-shek intended to fight the Japanese or actually fought them only after the U.S. participation of the war is still going on, but Professor Warren Cohen was conclusively indicated that the famous battle of Hunan was not fought by Chiang's own armies. "Who fought the Japanese in Hunan? Some views of China's War Effort," Journal of Asian Studies XXVII: no. 1; (November 1967), 111-115.
23. Chiang's unity "with the Communists merely in body and not in spirit" is well verified, by subsequent developments, and the U.S. mediation between the Chungking government and the Communists does not need further proof. See: Mao Tse-tung hstlan-chi (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung), (Peking, 1961) v. 2, pp. 769-775; John K. Fairbank, et. al., East Asia, the Modern Transformation, (Boston, 1963), p. 857; Van Slyke ed., op. cit., pp. 72-92.

24. This indicates his personal experience in negotiating with the Nationalist generals. See: Kung Te-po, Wang Chao-ming hsiang-ti mai-kuo mi-shih (The Secret History of Wang Ching-wei, His Surrender to the Enemy and Sell-out of the Country), (n.p. 1963), pp. 74-75. Chin, op. cit., vol. 2. pp. 11-41.
25. This is the strongest appeal of Wang to strengthen the Nanking government and to preserve the vitality of the people. It was made in combination with the tactics of Chou Fo-hai to counter the Japanese military in China. Wang was able to achieve at least part of his demands. Chin, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 91-178.
26. Considering the circumstance, the record of Wang's success in recovering rights and power from the Japanese since the Pacific War was no mean achievement. Ibid.
27. Wang's maneuver was probably based on his personal popularity with the Japanese people and politicians, and he hoped to appeal directly to the highest Japanese authorities to counter the ruthless actions of the Japanese military in China. Furthermore, Wang realized that there was still some value for the Japanese to make use of the Nanking government to achieve the twin purpose of promoting a general peace with Chungking and of cooperating with the Japanese to prosecute the Pacific War. Consequently, Wang turned these into assets to strengthen the Nanking government and to benefit the people in occupied China. As he indicated when the Japanese understood his motivation the Nanking government had already gained enough time and benefit in the process. Wang, "The Final Political Testament," loc. cit., p. 161. Chin Hsiung-pai also writes that the Japanese later often said to the officers of the Nanking government that "Chungking is resisting Japan by force; and you are resisting Japan by peace." Chin, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 177.
28. Chin, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 106.
29. Wang's intimate followers, Ch'en Kung-po, Chu Min-i, Lin Pai-sheng, Mei Ssu-p'ing and 2,720 others, were executed, and 2,300 including Chou Fo-hai and Ch'en Pi-chün, Wang's wife, were sentenced to life in prison. Thousands received jail sentences of a few years. Ibid. vol. 4, pp. 114-115. Because most of these people were moderate elements in the Kuomintang, their elimination was indeed a great blow to the Kuomintang.